Hamas Disarmament Plan Forces Gaza’s Hardest Trade

Can a Hamas disarmament plan survive if the side surrendering weapons and the side withdrawing forces both believe delay is survival?

That is the real test beneath the proposal now on the table: Hamas would hand over weapons while Israel pulls out of the 70% of Gaza it occupies, according to BBC World. Jeremy Bowen’s central point is blunt: Hamas has never agreed to disarm before, which makes this a rare diplomatic opening, but the politics, destruction, distrust and battlefield realities make it brutally hard to execute.

For XOOMAR’s running coverage of the proposal, see Trump Bets on Hamas Disarmament Deal No One Has Confirmed and Trump’s Hamas Disarmament Deal Runs Into Gaza’s Test.

Can the Hamas disarmament plan become more than a ceasefire clause?

The Hamas disarmament plan is not a technical add-on to a ceasefire. It cuts into the core question of who controls Gaza after the war.

The bargain sounds clean on paper: Hamas gives up weapons, Israel withdraws from territory it holds. In practice, each side sees sequencing as existential. Israel wants Hamas fully disarmed before withdrawal. Hamas links concessions to Israeli pullback. That gap is not procedural. It is the agreement.

XOOMAR analysis: The plan creates hope because it offers a sequence beyond bombardment, siege and reprisal. It creates a possible route from military pressure to political process. But it also asks actors with almost no trust to move in parallel, and to believe that the other side won’t exploit the first concession.

That is why “handled carefully and well” matters. A rushed declaration of success would mean little. The hard part is verification, timing and enforcement, especially if battlefield incidents or political shocks interrupt the process.

How do Gaza’s casualty numbers shrink the room for a weapons deal?

The human toll makes every concession harder to sell.

The BBC reports that life in Gaza is catastrophic for well over 2 million Palestinian civilians. It cites the Hamas-run health ministry, whose figures are seen as reliable by the UN, as saying Israel killed more than 70,000 Palestinians during the war and more than 1,000 more since the ceasefire. Unicef says Israel has killed more than 20,000 children since 7 October 2023, with at least 1,000 babies among the dead and wounded.

Those figures sit beside Israel’s trauma from 7 October 2023, when Hamas and other Palestinians attacked Israel, killing almost 1,200 people, around two thirds of them civilians including children, and taking 251 people into Gaza as hostages.

The rubble matters too. Bowen writes that Gaza’s destruction is not only the result of Israel Defense Forces operations, but also an “organised, officially sponsored project” to destroy communities and infrastructure, with civilian demolition contractors from Israel contracted to continue what IDF bombs began.

Many Palestinians believe Israel wants to make life so unbearable that they leave if given the chance. Bowen also reports that leaders and senior officials inside Jordan and Egypt believe powerful figures in the Israeli government are creating conditions for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, most likely across their borders.

That belief will shape whether Gazans see disarmament as a path to survival or another stage of coercion.

Why would Hamas give up weapons when it is still fighting for relevance?

Hamas is under severe pressure. The BBC says most of its senior men and thousands of its fighters have been killed by Israel. The IDF still assassinates senior Hamas figures when it gets a chance. Hamas also faces challenges from powerful families and from militias funded and backed by Israel.

That pressure helps explain why Khalil al Hayya, newly confirmed as Hamas’s political leader, became central to the decision to drop objections to the framework. Egypt and Turkey did much of the diplomatic work to move him there, according to the BBC.

But pressure does not equal trust.

XOOMAR analysis: For Hamas, weapons are bargaining power in the disarmament sequence. If the group hands them over and Israel does not pull back, Hamas risks appearing defeated while Gaza remains occupied and shattered. If it refuses, it risks being blamed for blocking relief and prolonging destruction.

Bowen includes this account from BBC Gaza correspondent Rushdi Abu Alouf, which shows Hamas trying to rebuild social and political standing even while weakened militarily:

"For months, Hamas increasingly shifted part of its focus back to social and political outreach, expanding Quran memorisation programmes and charitable activities aimed at children, teenagers and young people, while taking advantage of the severe humanitarian crisis and the growing dependence of so many families on aid."

That quote matters. It suggests Hamas is not only negotiating over arms. It is also trying to remain part of Gaza’s political and social fabric.

Why do Israel, Washington and regional mediators want different things from a disarmed Gaza?

Israel’s position is anchored in security. Bowen writes that in Israel’s Jewish majority, about 80% or so, there is a strong view that Hamas will remain a deadly threat until it is totally disarmed and stripped of any vestige of power.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also faces an election at the end of October. Bowen reports that Netanyahu is behind in the polls and fighting for his political life, legacy and potentially liberty, given his long-running corruption trial. While he remains in office, the trial has slowed “to a crawl,” but that would change if he lost power.

The US pressure runs through Donald Trump. The BBC says the US has midterms in November, and Trump needs a win in Gaza after being unable to claim one in the war on Iran. Bowen’s read is that Trump could blame Netanyahu if he decides the Israeli prime minister is blocking the victory he wants.

Regional mediators matter because Hamas’s concessions did not emerge alone. Egypt and Turkey helped move the talks. But the BBC also points to a wider regional fear: Jordanian and Egyptian officials believe elements inside Israel’s government want to push Palestinians out.

That makes any Arab-backed transition politically dangerous. A plan seen as stabilizing Gaza could gain space. A plan seen as policing Palestinians while Israel keeps decisive control could collapse before it starts.

Can a step-by-step deal survive the West Bank and Israeli election calendar?

Bowen argues that only a step-by-step agreement, starting small and building confidence, has a chance. That is the most realistic part of the plan, and also its weakness.

The process needs sustained US engagement. Bowen questions whether Trump will stay focused, given a war with Iran and other global pressures. It also needs no sudden shock that makes mediation impossible.

The occupied West Bank is the most obvious danger point in the BBC account. Bowen cites ACLED, the armed conflict monitor, as saying 2026 is on track to become the most violent year in the West Bank since it began monitoring the territory a decade ago. He also writes that Jewish settlers have been allowed by the IDF and encouraged by extremists in Netanyahu’s government to attack Palestinians, sometimes killing them and driving them off their land.

Palestinians have been organizing to resist. Some opponents and critics of Netanyahu believe he wants a major West Bank crisis to justify a tough response before the Israeli election and remove pressure to pull back in Gaza.

Netanyahu and prominent ministers have repeatedly said there will never be a Palestinian state. Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s finance minister, is committing the government to decisions aimed at increasing Jewish settlement and killing off the prospects of an independent Palestine, according to the BBC. Smotrich has been sanctioned by major Western countries and banned from entering the UK, France, other leading European nations, Australia and New Zealand. Israel condemned those decisions as antisemitic.

Which path does Gaza take if the disarmament proposal moves forward?

There are three plausible tracks, all visible in the source material.

Fragile deal: Hamas disarmament begins in phases. Israel pulls back in measurable steps. Mediators keep both sides moving. Aid increases. A governing framework emerges that Palestinians can accept because it offers more than control and rubble.

Frozen conflict: The parties argue over sequence. Israel demands full disarmament first. Hamas demands withdrawal first. Washington pressures both sides, but Netanyahu plays for time until the Israeli election. Gaza remains trapped between partial ceasefire and unresolved war.

Breakdown: A shock in Gaza or the West Bank kills momentum. Israel resumes or expands operations. Hamas claims Israel never intended to withdraw. Humanitarian collapse deepens, and any future administration inherits a territory even harder to govern.

The Hamas disarmament plan will not survive because its language is elegant. It will survive only if sequencing is credible, verification is real and Palestinians see a political horizon instead of another form of control. The evidence to track is concrete: weapons handover mechanisms, Israeli pullback from the 70% of Gaza it occupies, sustained mediator engagement, and whether Gaza’s civilians see material relief before the politics harden again.

Impact Analysis

• The plan is rare because Hamas has not previously agreed to disarm.
• Sequencing is the central obstacle because both sides fear the other will exploit any first move.
• Success would require verification, enforcement and political trust in a devastated Gaza.