136 Nations Kill Infantino's FIFA World Cup Investment Plan

Gianni Infantino’s FIFA World Cup investment plan was effectively dead once Uefa, Concacaf and the AFC lined up enough votes to block it. FIFA needed 106 of its 211 member associations to back the proposal. If confederation positions held, 136 nations were set against it.

That vote math explains the U-turn. Infantino has now scrapped the proposal to bring private investment into FIFA’s major competitions, including the men’s and women’s World Cups, after saying it had “created divisions” that were “no longer in the interest” of the plan’s original goal, according to BBC World.

“As a result, this proposal will not proceed.”

This was not just a financing dispute. It was a power dispute. The FIFA World Cup investment plan tested whether football’s most valuable national-team competitions could be partly opened to outside capital without triggering a governance revolt. The answer, for now, is no.

FIFA World Cup investment plan collapsed because the politics outran the money

Infantino’s pitch had a simple hook: money for member associations. He offered all 211 FIFA members $40m (£30m) if they backed private investment in FIFA tournaments, with a 19 September deadline to accept the plan if they wanted access to an initial $20m (£15m).

That is a huge sum for many federations. It also made the proposal look less like normal consultation and more like a pressure campaign. The sharper the deadline, the more opponents could frame the deal as a forced choice over the future economics of the World Cup.

FIFA initially insisted it would press on. On Friday it said “nobody is selling football”. By early Saturday, Infantino had reversed course.

The retreat is rare because Infantino had been expected, before this week, to be re-elected unopposed at FIFA’s next presidential election. Instead, he enters the run-up to the 77th Congress in Morocco next March under pressure, with candidates having until 18 November to put their names forward.

For more on the original proposal, see XOOMAR’s earlier coverage of the FIFA stake sale fight over World Cup control.

A commercial subsidiary became a referendum on who controls FIFA’s biggest competitions

The core structure was a new commercial subsidiary called Fifa Forward Enterprise (FFE). FIFA said it would “invite third parties to make minority, non-controlling investments” in that entity, which would run its main events.

The phrase “minority, non-controlling” was meant to calm fears. It did not.

A minority investor may not control votes, but investment terms still matter. XOOMAR analysis: once outside capital enters an entity built around World Cups and other FIFA events, member associations will want to know exactly how future revenue, rights, incentives, governance and commercial priorities are protected. That concern was visible in Conmebol’s response, which asked FIFA for “additional information and clarifications” on the “scope, structure, governance and possible effects” of the plan.

A 25-page JP Morgan document said FIFA’s tournaments could expand to reach an estimated increased payout of 24m euros (£20.5m) per member association in the 2035-2039 cycle. It described the World Cup as the “most widely viewed” sporting event and FIFA as “under-monetised”. It also referred to “new business initiatives” and “attracting top talent with incentive-driven compensation”.

One omission mattered. The BBC reported there was no mention in the document of the women’s game.

That gap gave critics another opening. If FIFA wanted to reshape the economics of its major competitions, opponents could ask why one of those competitions was absent from the investor-facing case.

Uefa, Concacaf and the AFC turned opposition into a blocking coalition

The decisive pressure came from confederations.

Uefa’s 55 member associations voted on Thursday to boycott World Cups if the plan went ahead. Concacaf, covering North, Central America and the Caribbean, said its members “rejected” the proposal. The AFC then said it stood in “solidarity” with Uefa and Concacaf.

Put together, Uefa’s 55 votes, Concacaf’s 35, and Asia’s 46 made the proposal highly unlikely to pass if member associations followed their confederations. FIFA needed a majority of 106. The opposing bloc could reach 136.

That is why the retreat looked less like a voluntary reset than a forced climbdown.

Shaikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, the AFC president, welcomed the withdrawal and framed the issue as governance, not just finance.

“The future of global football must always be shaped through proper consultation, collective dialogue and respect for the established governance structures of our game.”

That sentence cuts to the center of the story. The opposition was not saying FIFA cannot make money. It was saying FIFA cannot redesign the commercial architecture of the World Cup without convincing the institutions that lend it legitimacy.

Infantino’s internal support cracked at the worst possible moment

The external revolt would have been damaging enough. The internal rupture was worse.

Carlos Cordeiro, Infantino’s senior adviser on global strategy and governance, resigned over the proposal. He called it “a bad deal for football” and said it would “mortgage football’s future”. He also said he had no involvement in the proposal.

Then FIFA chief operating officer Kevin Lamour said FIFA’s own administration had been “deceived” about the project. He called it “the project of one person” and said:

“If that means I lose my job, then so be it. I will understand and respect that decision. At least I’ll sleep well tonight.”

That kind of public dissent from senior figures changes the political texture. It gave confederations and member associations cover to oppose Infantino more aggressively. It also weakened the argument that the proposal was the product of broad internal alignment.

Infantino’s defenders can point to his stated purpose. In his withdrawal statement, he said the plan was designed to strengthen member associations, “especially in countries where support is most needed”, adding: “Our purpose has always been - and always will be - to unite and improve.”

But the collapse shows he misread the tolerance level. FIFA members may want larger distributions. They were not prepared to accept this structure, this timetable, and this level of uncertainty.

Thrive Eternal’s role added another layer of sensitivity

FIFA said Thrive Eternal was expected to lead the proposed investor group for FFE. Thrive is an American venture capital firm founded by Joshua Kushner, the brother of Jared Kushner, who is US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law.

The BBC reported that Trump said he had not spoken to Infantino about the plan. The two have developed a close relationship since Trump assumed office for a second time in 2025.

That political proximity did not prove anything improper. But it made the optics harder. A private investor linked by family to a prominent political circle was attached to a proposal involving the World Cup, at the same time FIFA was already facing a governance backlash.

XOOMAR analysis: in a deal involving ordinary commercial rights, that might be manageable. In a deal involving stakes tied to FIFA’s biggest competitions, every relationship becomes part of the trust equation.

This follows a broader pattern in global institutions: when leadership tries to concentrate decision-making around a major structural shift, scrutiny moves quickly from the transaction to the people behind it. For another example of institutional backlash under political pressure, see XOOMAR’s analysis of how the Senate handed Jay Clayton the DNI job after the Pulte backlash.

FIFA’s next challenge is revenue growth without reopening the same wound

The FIFA World Cup investment plan is dead, but FIFA’s commercial problem has not disappeared.

The JP Morgan document’s language tells the story. FIFA’s tournaments are described as massively watched but “under-monetised”. That is the tension Infantino was trying to exploit. The World Cup generates unmatched attention, and FIFA wants to turn more of that attention into member funding.

The safer routes are now more likely to matter: sponsorship, media packages, licensing, hospitality and event partnerships. Those tools may still be controversial, but they do not carry the same symbolic charge as selling even a minority stake in the economics of FIFA competitions.

Investors will read this episode carefully. Football assets remain attractive, but the governance risk is obvious when money touches national-team competitions with deep institutional and political meaning. A deal can look financially elegant and still fail because the voting base sees it as a loss of control.

For Infantino, the next test is not whether he can find another way to raise money. He probably can. The test is whether he can persuade member associations and confederations that major commercial restructuring will be built through consultation rather than presented as a deadline-backed package.

Evidence that would strengthen his position: public support from confederations that opposed this plan, clearer governance terms for future commercial projects, and no rival emerging before 18 November.

Evidence that would weaken it: more resignations, associations withdrawing re-election support, or renewed disputes over FIFA’s tournament economics.

FIFA can sell many things around the World Cup. This week showed that selling even a piece of the competition’s future economics crosses a line football’s power brokers are not ready to move.

Impact Analysis

• The collapse shows FIFA cannot easily open World Cup revenues to private investors without broad political consent.
• The opposition from major confederations exposed a serious governance split inside global football.
• The failed vote math weakens Infantino’s position ahead of FIFA’s next Congress and presidential cycle.