X Fights eSafety Over Gore as Inman Grant Sounds Alarm

Julie Inman Grant told Australia’s antisemitism royal commission that mainstream platforms are fighting to distribute and monetise gore, not merely failing to remove it.

That is the sharper point in the Julie Inman Grant gore content testimony. The expected story was platform moderation under pressure. The reality described by Australia’s eSafety commissioner was more confrontational: regulators trying to restrict graphic violence while platforms, with X singled out, push back over access to that material.

Inman Grant gave evidence on Thursday to the royal commission on antisemitism and social cohesion, according to Guardian World. Her evidence framed the fight as a collision between Australian safety law and platforms built around engagement.

“But these are mainstream platforms fighting for the right and the ability to distribute and monetise gore and fringe content.”

That sentence matters because it shifts the debate from moderation capacity to platform incentives. XOOMAR analysis: if the regulator is right, the issue is not just whether harmful clips can be detected. It is whether platforms have enough reason to suppress content that can draw attention, argument, reposting, and repeat viewing.

X’s Bondi footage fight exposed a harder platform problem

Inman Grant singled out X and its billionaire owner, Elon Musk, during the hearing. She said her office had to fight to keep footage, including material posted after the Bondi terror attack, restricted or off the platform.

The most revealing exchange concerned X’s response to the Bondi footage. Inman Grant said eSafety “fought hard” to get footage of the attack “refused classification”, making it illegal to distribute in Australia. X, she said, argued that the material was “not any worse than you would see in a gore movie”.

“And I said: ‘I can’t think of anything more horrific for the family members and the Australian Jewish community’,” she told the commission.

The dispute shows the gap between platform framing and victim framing. A platform can treat a clip as content to classify. Families and targeted communities experience it as trauma, intimidation, and public repetition of violence.

That gap is why the Julie Inman Grant gore content evidence landed inside an antisemitism inquiry, rather than a narrow content moderation hearing. The commission’s current block of hearings is focused on social media and traditional media. Inman Grant’s point was that violent material, hate speech, and fringe content can overlap in the same distribution system.

eSafety’s mandate leaves antisemitic abuse falling through the cracks

The eSafety commissioner’s powers do not explicitly cover antisemitism or hate speech. Inman Grant said the office’s mandate covers cyberbullying, adult cyber-abuse, image-based abuse, and illegal and restricted online content.

That legal design creates a high bar. She said only 2% of adult cyber-abuse complaints made to her office meet the threshold for action because of freedom of speech protections. ABC reported that Inman Grant said eSafety received 108,000 complaints about harmful online content in the year to June 30, 2026, up from 55,000 the previous financial year, and that the office had fewer than 40 investigators.

Those numbers do not prove platforms are monetising every harmful item. They do show a mismatch between complaint volume and the regulator’s ability to act.

Before vs. after the commission testimony:

• Before: The adult cyber-abuse scheme looked like the main legal channel for many victims seeking action.
• After: Inman Grant described that scheme as “not fit for purpose” for antisemitic harassment that may be cumulative, degrading, and repeated without always containing direct threats.
• Before: Platform moderation could be seen as an operational failure.
• After: The evidence framed some disputes as active resistance to restriction.

Her comparison with child cyberbullying was pointed. In one South Australian case, a 14-year-old girl received a “barrage of death and rape threats” after rejecting a date request from a boy. eSafety contacted the school and parents, then sent an end user notice requiring proof the content was deleted and a pledge not to repeat the conduct.

Adults do not get the same practical response unless the legal threshold is met.

Algorithms are the pressure point, not only takedown buttons

Inman Grant’s broader claim was not limited to X. She said social media platforms are spending more to challenge regulation while spending less on trust and safety teams, and that they feel protected by the anti-regulation Trump administration.

She also argued that platforms have the technical ability to act. The Guardian reported her saying their sophisticated ability to target users with “deadly precision” through algorithms showed they have the ability to stop harmful material. In a related eSafety statement reported by 7NEWS, she said:

“Algorithms reward engagement, even when that is driven by shock, fear and outrage.”

XOOMAR analysis: this is the core enforcement problem. Regulators tend to see harm after publication, complaint, escalation, and review. Platforms see the content earlier in the distribution chain. They control labels, interstitials, recommendations, removals, and restrictions.

The public record here does not show the full monetisation mechanics. It does not disclose ad placement, revenue per clip, or internal reach data. So the strongest supported claim is narrower but still serious: Australia’s online safety regulator says mainstream platforms are fighting for the right and ability to distribute and monetise gore and fringe content.

That alone is enough to make this a governance fight.

For adjacent XOOMAR coverage on how social feeds keep absorbing new user experiences, see Meta Pocket Sneaks AI Game Making Into Social Feeds. For a separate look at tech power and institutional pressure inside AI companies, read Google DeepMind Unionization Fight Corners AI Leaders.

X is turning moderation disputes into jurisdiction disputes

Of the eight cases the regulator is now fighting with X, Inman Grant said six were instigated by X. She also said X pushed back over Australians’ access to the Charlie Kirk assassination video, the stabbing of Iryna Zarutska on a Charlotte train, and the church stabbing of Bishop Mar Mari Emmanuel in Wakeley, New South Wales.

That list matters because it shows the dispute is not isolated to one incident or one community. The Bondi footage is the most politically charged example in this hearing because of the antisemitism and social cohesion context. But the regulator described a wider pattern around violent content.

XOOMAR analysis: when a platform owner publicly resists content restrictions, takedown fights stop being narrow compliance arguments. They become sovereignty arguments. Australia can classify material and restrict distribution inside its borders. A global platform can challenge, delay, narrow, or contest how far those restrictions reach.

Other platforms were not cleared by the evidence. Inman Grant named mainstream platforms broadly, and related eSafety material cited X, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, and YouTube as places where gore content circulated. But X was the platform singled out in the royal commission evidence as the clearest legal stress test.

Christchurch, Bondi, and the repeated failure of violent-content containment

Inman Grant referred to earlier complexities in having footage of the Christchurch massacre removed, as well as attempts to have paedophile and suicide-incitement websites taken down. She described complex hosting arrangements and the difficulty of forcing removal when sites operate across jurisdictions.

The pattern is grim. Violent content appears. It is copied, shared, reported, restricted, contested, and sometimes reappears. Platforms may label or blur graphic material, but related eSafety material said major platforms have failed to deploy those filters quickly or consistently.

The commission also heard about coordination issues. Western Australian police deputy commissioner Kylie Whiteley said there had been delays finalising a memorandum of understanding with eSafety. Australian federal police assistant commissioner Stephen Nutt described the AFP’s relationship with the regulator as “very good” and said they were working on better protocols. New South Wales police assistant commissioner Leanne McCusker said live incidents should involve both eSafety and the National Situation Room to avoid barriers.

That points to another gap. Even when the law is clear, operational coordination can lag.

Different groups are asking for different internet rules

The hearing did not include a full advertiser or civil liberties record, so claims about brand pressure or free speech campaigns would outrun the supplied evidence. What the record does show is a conflict already built into the law: freedom of speech protections help explain why only 2% of adult cyber-abuse complaints meet the threshold for action.

Jewish community harms were central to the testimony. Inman Grant said she imagined many in the Jewish community were experiencing antisemitism and racism daily, with a cumulative impact on mental health and wellbeing.

Sarah Schwartz, executive director of the Jewish Council of Australia, also told the inquiry that progressive Jewish people were targeted by a “constellation” of neo-Nazis and pro-Israel advocates. She said she withdrew a personal safety intervention order because it was going to make her less safe after media coverage republished offensive imagery connected to the matter.

That evidence reinforces the same point from a different angle. Harm is not just the original post. It can be the repetition, republication, escalation, and loss of control.

The next break point is platform responsibility, not platform promises

The practical implications are clear enough without pretending the future is settled. If Australia follows Inman Grant’s logic, the pressure will move toward more platform responsibility, possible online hate rules, better coordination with police, and stronger expectations around restricting graphic material.

For Australians using X, the likely friction points are content access, classification fights, and more visible disputes between the platform and eSafety. For other platforms, the warning is direct: the regulator is publicly naming the business incentive behind gore and fringe content, not only the moderation failure.

Evidence that would strengthen Inman Grant’s case would include clearer data on how often violent content is recommended, how quickly filters are applied, how many users see material before restriction, and how platforms handle repeat circulation. Evidence that would weaken it would show consistent, fast restriction of gore and antisemitic abuse without repeated legal fights.

The unresolved question is now unavoidable: can Australia force global platforms to absorb the social costs of content they can monetise at scale?

Impact Analysis

• The testimony reframes harmful content as an incentives problem, not just a moderation failure.
• Australia’s safety laws are being tested against global platforms’ distribution practices.
• The case could shape how regulators respond to violent, antisemitic, and fringe content online.